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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, AND
THE ROBERTS COURT: NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL
DIMENSIONS OF THE OVER-DETERRENCE HYPOTHESIS
DONALD DRiPPS*
Supreme Court watchers anticipate a fresh assault on the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule by the Roberts Court. This apprehension
requires no great subtlety of perception; in Hudson v. Michigan,1 a majority
of the Court baldly announced that the rule had outlived its usefulness. The
Court's decision to broaden the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule in Herring v. United States2 is another sign.
This essay engages in the risky business of predicting future Supreme
Court developments. In the first part, I analyze the evidence suggesting that
the Roberts Court might abolish the exclusionary rule. The critique of ex-
clusion in Hudson is both less and more probative than appears at first
blush. Justice Kennedy joined that part of the opinion, making a majority,
but then filed a concurrence disavowing any intention of abolition. On the
other hand, the willingness of a majority to join an opinion bereft of em-
pirical support and willfully blind to long-standing and cogent contrary
arguments rather forcefully suggests a group of men with minds made up.
Part II turns to some less obvious evidence pointing in the direction of
retaining the exclusionary rule. First, abolition of the exclusionary rule is
inconsistent with the Hudson majority's apparent contentment with prevail-
ing police behavior. The exclusionary rule is a component of the status quo,
so unless a majority believes that police behavior should become signifi-
cantly more aggressive and intrusive, abolition would not reflect the policy
preferences of that majority. Put another way, the case for abolition pre-
supposes that the current remedial mix over-deters Fourth Amendment
violations. Both logic and the available empirical evidence suggest other-
wise.
Second, abolition of the exclusionary rule would curtail the power of
the Supreme Court. Combined, the infrequency of suits and qualified im-
munity would bring very few substantive Fourth Amendment issues to the
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
1. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
2. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
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Court. A majority is unlikely to reduce its own power in this way, particu-
larly given that this same majority can always rule for the police on the
merits. We do not need to consult the wisdom of the founders or the statis-
tics of political scientists to prove the point. The Supreme Court's own
criminal procedure doctrine makes the case. A majority is not likely to cede
power over search-and-seizure to state courts, legislatures, and police ad-
ministrators.
Part III offers a prediction of a somewhat different sort. If the Court
were to abolish the exclusionary rule, the exclusionary rule would return, in
some form, in a decade or so. Police-yea, even modem, professional po-
lice-consistently have shaped their behavior according to admissibility
rather than legality. Wholesale abolition of the exclusionary rule would
lead to enough flagrant abuses that even the current justices would likely
bring the rule back. Changes in the composition of the Court might make
this more likely still.
Prediction is hazardous. I hazard, however, the prediction that the
Roberts Court will not abolish the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
I. HUDSON
The issue in Hudson was whether the exclusionary rule applies to evi-
dence obtained in the search of a residence authorized by a valid warrant
but executed inconsistently with the knock-and-announce requirement an-
nounced in Wilson v. Arkansas.3 The Court divided five to four, holding
that the rule does not apply. This result could have been reached on the
ground of inevitable discovery, 4 and the majority noted as much.
5
Part IIB of the opinion nonetheless deployed the now familiar cost-
benefit balancing test.6 The majority went so far as to say that the costs of
exclusion outweighed the benefits even if the knock-and-announce rule
would be nullified by withholding this remedy. 7 Justice Scalia's discussion
repeats the pro-police mantra: exclusion is a "massive remedy' 8 that carries
3. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 588-89 (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-32 (1995)).
4. Id. at 604 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In this case the relevant evidence was discovered not
because of a failure to knock and announce, but because of a subsequent search pursuant to a lawful
warrant. The Court in my view is correct to hold that suppression was not required.").
5. Id. at 601 ("While acquisition of the gun and drugs was the product of a search pursuant to
warrant, it was not the fruit of the fact that the entry was not preceded by knock-and-announce.").
6. Id. at 594-99.
7. Id. at 596 ("Of course even if this assertion [that without suppression there will be no deter-
rence of knock-and-announce violations at all] were accurate, it would not necessarily justify suppres-
sion.").
8. Id. at 599 ("Resort to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt is unjustified.").
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"substantial social costs." 9
The opinion adds, however, a new argument: Fourth Amendment
remedies may have been inadequate when Mapp was decided in 1961, but
those remedies are much stronger now.10 Justice Scalia pointed to the rec-
ognition of entity liability in Monnell,11 the provision authorizing payment
of attorney's fees to successful § 1983 plaintiffs, 12 and the increasing pro-
fessionalization of the police. 13
9. The Court stated:
Suppression of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, not our first impulse. The
exclusionary rule generates "substantial social costs," which sometimes include setting the
guilty free and the dangerous at large. We have therefore been "cautio[us] against expanding"
it, and "have repeatedly emphasized that the rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-seeking and law
enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application." We have
rejected "[i]ndiscriminate application" of the rule, and have held it to be applicable only
"where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,"-that is, "where its de-
terrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs."'
Id. at 591 (citations omitted).
10.
We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary deterrence simply because we
found that it was necessary deterrence in different contexts and long ago. That would be forc-
ing the public today to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a legal regime that existed almost
halfa century ago. Dollree Mapp could not turn to... 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for meaningful relief;
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which began the slow but steady expansion of that
remedy, was decided the same Term as Mapp.
Id. at 597 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 495 (1961)).
11. Id. ("It would be another 17 years [after the decision in Mapp] before the § 1983 remedy was
extended to reach the deep pocket of municipalities [in] Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, (1978). Citizens whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated by federal officers could
not bring suit until 10 years after Mapp, with this Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388(1971).").
12. Id. ("Since some civil-rights violations would yield damages too small to justify the expense
of litigation, Congress has authorized attorney's fees for civil-rights plaintiffs. This remedy was un-
available in the heydays of our exclusionary-rule jurisprudence, because it is tied to the availability of a
cause of action.").
13.
Another development over the past half-century that deters civil-rights violations is the in-
creasing professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal police disci-
pline. Even as long ago as 1980 we felt it proper to "assume" that unlawful police behavior
would "be dealt with appropriately" by the authorities ... but we now have increasing evi-
dence that police forces across the United States take the constitutional rights of citizens seri-
ously. There have been "wide-ranging reforms in the education, training, and supervision of
police officers."
Id. at 598-99 (quoting SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990 51 (1993)). Dr. Walker subsequently protested that Justice Scalia had
failed to appreciate the extent to which police professionalism is a product of the exclusionary rule:
Scalia's opinion suggests that the results I highlighted have sufficiently removed the need for
an exclusionary rule to act as a judicial-branch watchdog over the police. I have never said or
even suggested such a thing. To the contrary, I have argued that the results reinforce the
Supreme Court's continuing importance in defining constitutional protections for individual
rights and requiring the appropriate remedies for violations, including the exclusion of
evidence.
Samuel Walker, Opinion, Thanks for Nothing, Nino, L.A. TIMES, at M5, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2006Jun/25/opinion/oe-walker25 (June 25, 2006).
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If this isn't a brief for abolition, it sure looks like one. Indeed, it is dif-
ficult to characterize Part IIIB as anything else, given the ease with which
the case could be resolved on other grounds. The really portentous aspect
of Hudson, however, is not the content, but the character, of Justice
Scalia's discussion.
Justice Scalia did not mention two cogent and long-standing argu-
ments against the cost-benefit analysis. One is that the cost of lost convic-
tions is attributable not to the exclusionary remedy but to the underlying
Fourth Amendment right. 14 If the police comply with constitutional stan-
dards, the evidence would never be discovered and the guilty would remain
at large.
In unusual cases, like the knock-and-announce cases, compliance with
constitutional standards does not prevent the discovery of the evidence. The
inevitable discovery exception covers these cases. Whenever Fourth
Amendment doctrine forbids discovery of evidence, a "cost" results only if
a current policy preference for unlimited law-enforcement is given priority
over the constitutional preference for limiting law-enforcement power.
In a minority of cases, exclusion costs the public a conviction the po-
lice might later have enabled without violating the Fourth Amendment.
When police have probable cause but don't bother getting a warrant, or
when they search an automobile with less than probable cause but later
learn of information that would have gotten them over the hump, we can
say that the exclusionary rule, rather than the Fourth Amendment, caused
the loss of the evidence. Most of the time, however, the police never could
have made a case without violating the Fourth Amendment, and the inevi-
table discovery exception again covers many of the cases where they might
have done so.t 5
The second familiar argument Justice Scalia ignored is related to the
first. Any effective remedy for Fourth Amendment violations will carry
14. See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 914 (Cal. 1955) ("It is contended, however, that the
police do not always have a choice of securing evidence by legal means and that in many cases the
criminal will escape if illegally obtained evidence cannot be used against him. This contention is not
properly directed at the exclusionary rule, but at the constitutional provisions themselves."); see also
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1533
(1999) ("[M]ost of the people who make this criticism do not argue that the misconduct should be
condoned or redefined as proper conduct; they merely advocate the substitution of other sanctions that
would not involve excluding the fruits of the illegal search.").
15. See Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1,
12 (2001) ("Exclusion does terminate a few prosecutions that the Fourth Amendment might have
permitted given better police work; but because the very great majority of crimes are not cleared by
arrest there is good reason to doubt that perfect police work would have secured convictions in very
many of those few cases lost to suppression motions.").
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those same "substantial social costs."' 16 Justice Scalia seems in a celebra-
tory mood in writing about damage actions and police professionalism, as
if searches that don't take place because of the threat of tort liability or
departmental discipline are somehow different from searches that don't
take place because of the threat of exclusion.
These points have been in the literature since the 1920s. 17 If they were
bad arguments we would expect exclusionary rule critics to acknowledge
them and reply. Justice Scalia's silence is telling in two ways. The first is
that it corroborates the familiar critique of the Court's cost-benefit ap-
proach. The second is that the very indifference to these familiar arguments
reflects minds bent on a conclusion. There may be good rejoinders to the
"blame the right not the remedy" and "damage actions have the same
costs" arguments (although I have not seen compelling rejoinders in the
literature). Anyone who was a fair-minded critic of the exclusionary rule
who had such a rejoinder would surely have deployed it.
The claim that modem tort suits and modem police departments have
made the exclusionary rule unnecessary reflects the same prejudice against
the exclusionary rule. Legal recognition of municipal liability is both diffi-
cult to establish 18 and practically irrelevant. Cities and police departments
typically pay for the defense of claims against individual officers and in-
demnify the officers after a settlement or a plaintiff's verdict. 19 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(B), authorizing attorney's fees for successful plaintiffs, passed the
Congress in 1976. There is no correlative provision for Bivens actions.20
The practically relevant rules for damage actions against the police
16. E.g., id. at 19 ("They would, however, carry the downside of effective deterrents: they would
cause many crimes to go unexposed, foster police perjury to defeat liability, and might chill officers
from conducting justified but borderline searches and seizures") (footnotes omitted); Posner, supra note
14, at 1533 ("If the substitute sanctions were effective in deterring the misconduct, there would not be
any fruits, and so there would be no net gain from the standpoint of accuracy in adjudication.").
17. See Connor Hall, Letter to the Editor, Evidence and the Fourth Amendment, 8 A.B.A. J. 646,
647 (1922) ("If punishment of the officer is effective to prevent unlawful searches, then equally by this
is justice rendered inefficient and criminals coddled. It is only by violations that the great god Effi-
ciency can thrive.").
18. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 263 (2000)
("Occasionally, localities can be sued directly under § 1983 and held liable without proof of fault, but
the circumstances are very limited.").
19. Id. at 267 ("[G]overnments routinely defend their officers against constitutional tort claims
and indemnify them for adverse judgments.").
20. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1555, 1631 n.253 (2003) ("Fees
are apparently unavailable for Bivens actions brought by federal inmates ... because the Equal Access
to Justice Act allows fees to be awarded against the federal government only when some other substan-
tive statute authorizes them.. . or when a case is against the United States directly or an officer in his or
her official capacity.... What little case law I have found on this subject suggests that neither condition
holds for Bivens actions for damages, which are brought directly under the Constitution against officers
in their individual capacities." (citations omitted)).
2010]
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thus have not changed for more than thirty years. If there has been a
change, it has been cultural rather than legal. Marc Miller and Ron
Wright's survey of reported settlements of suits against police presents
persuasive evidence that the police can be sued successfully.21 Previous
empirical work, however, indicated that recoveries against the police would
be substantial primarily when the police had inflicted physical injuries,
especially when the police acted in bad faith.22 As Wright and Miller point
out, the secrecy of settlements means that we can only speculate about the
nature of the claims. My own suspicion is that most of the settlements re-
ported by Wright and Miller involved claims based on Tennessee v. Gar-
ner23 or Graham v. Connor24 and not illegal stops, arrests, or auto searches.
It is revealing that Justice Scalia did not cite Wright and Miller. Their
article provides the best evidence, such as it is, of the practicality of tort
suits against the police. Justice Scalia and his colleagues in the Hudson
majority are, apparently, not interested in evidence, even when it supports
their conclusion. The stony indifference to both contrary arguments and
empirical evidence is a strong indication that the members of the Hudson
majority are bent, implacably, on abolition.
II. COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS
A. Hudson's Over-deterrence Hypothesis
Hudson itself may be less portentous than first appears. The tone of
section IIIB is more complacent than alarmist. Police behavior, once bad, is
now acceptable, or so one may plausibly interpret the Court's discussion.
The status quo, however, includes the exclusionary rule. A case for aboli-
tion therefore depends on the claim that the current remedial mix for Fourth
Amendment violations is excessive. What does it mean to say a constitu-
tional remedy is excessive? To answer that question we must grapple with
the concept of over-deterrence, first normatively, and then from the stand-
point of the available empirical evidence.
21. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the Missing
Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 757, 766-67 (2004).
22. See id. at 767 ("The largest cases tend to involve serious physical injuries or sexual miscon-
duct by officers. The bigger payments also occur when officers act based on racial prejudice or some
personal hostility to the plaintiff.").
23. 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (authorizing damages when a law enforcement officer uses deadly force
against a fleeing suspect who does not pose a threat to the safety of the officer or the public).
24. 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (authorizing damages when a law enforcement officer uses excessive
force in making an arrest).
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1. The Over-deterrence Concept
Remedies for the violation of legal rules optimally deter when poten-
tial violators rationally expect the value of the violation to be zero.25 If
violations can be expected to return net gains, the rule will be violated even
when compliance would be possible at lower net cost. If the regulated ac-
tors rationally anticipate the value of violations to be negative, they will
refrain from borderline but legal conduct with positive benefits or adopt
precautions that cost more than the value of the violations they prevent.
The standard tort model has some plausibility as applied to suits
against the police. Given the prevalence of defend-and-indemnify arrange-
ments, cities or police departments are repeat players estimating the bene-
fits and costs of their agents' behavior with respect to a large pool of cases.
In many of the cases in the pool, the legality of police action will be uncer-
tain ex ante. So over-deterrence and under-deterrence are both possible.
The police could avoid all Fourth Amendment violations by playing pi-
nochle in the station house, and they could uncover a lot of evidence by
searching either on mere suspicion or en masse. Society favors neither ex-
treme, and this looks a lot like how we think about industries that cause
some harm but confer great benefits, like mining, transportation, power
generation, and so on.
The difficulty in applying the optimal-deterrence prescription to
search-and-seizure is that there is no symmetry between the gains the regu-
lated actors secure from violations and the cost of those violations. Such
symmetry is thought to exist in tort law, where damages are set so that the
tortfeasor's damages equal the value of the plaintiffs loss, with punitives
or pain-and-suffering damages thrown in to account, very roughly, for the
reality that the probability of a successful suit even in meritorious cases is
less than one.
When the police kill or injure the victim, tort damages can be esti-
mated just as the tort system estimates damages for wrongful death or per-
25. For example, according to Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein:
As is well known, people can be given optimal incentives to take care if they are required to
pay damages for any financial losses that they cause (or negligently cause). Imagine, for ex-
ample, that a particular behavior, such as driving, will cause $1,000 in losses if an accident
occurs. A driver can control the probability that the loss will occur by taking more or less
care. The cost of care increases with the amount of care that is taken. The efficient level of
care is the amount at which the marginal cost of care equals the expected marginal cost of an
accident. By requiring the tortfeasor to pay damages, the law forces the driver to internalize
the losses that she creates, so that she will take precautions when the costs of those precau-
tions are less than the expected losses.




sonal injury in other cases. Even here, however, there is a good reason to
doubt that damage actions achieve optimal deterrence of unlawful police
violence. The qualified immunity defense means that police violence incurs
liability only when it is clearly excessive. The police employer therefore
does not expect to internalize the costs of every illegal police shooting or
beating, with corresponding incentives to train and discipline the force.
There are political incentives at work as well, but those may work in favor
of aggressive policing as well as against it. Police immunity gives reason to
doubt whether we are optimally deterring even police violence.
Damage actions, however, offer the only practical remedy for police
misconduct not motivated by the desire to initiate a formal prosecution.
The exclusionary rule does not deter police who beat up citizens for sport.
26
If we abolished qualified immunity (which was as unknown to the founders
as the exclusionary rule) we might come closer to optimal deterrence. The
risk, however, is that the prospect of liability might induce the police to
refrain from violence even when justified, leading to the escape of danger-
ous felons. The immunity defense was created to prevent this very contin-
gency.27
The exclusionary rule influences police behavior in the pool of cases
in which the objective of the search or seizure includes enabling a formal
prosecution. Strictly speaking, the victim of an unlawful search who is
prosecuted may both suppress the evidence on the criminal side and sue the
officers on the civil side. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld so called
plea-bargain/release agreements, in which the search victim waives civil
remedies as part of a plea deal.28
Typically, however, exclusion operates in cases where damage actions
face formidable valuation problems. We can perhaps estimate the em-
ployer's benefit from the government's willingness to pay tens of thou-
sands per year to incarcerate the guilty and the added expense of the police
force itself. Any such calculation will typically dwarf the economic damage
from unlawful stops, searches, and even arrests. Guessing about liquidated
damages runs the risk of over-deterrence.
The Hudson majority seems to suppose that this remedial mix of dam-
age actions, limited by qualified immunity and the exclusionary rule, is
over-deterring Fourth Amendment violations. To unpack the over-
26. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 15, at 30 n.141.
27. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CAL. L. REV.
1387, 1408 (2007) ("[A]ny attempt to extend damages liability to the case of borderline error runs
headlong into the judicial rationale for qualified immunity. In no other context is the problem of overde-
terrence-more precisely, the problem of unintended deterrence of legitimate acts-more keenly felt.").
28. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 398 (1987).
[Vol 85:1
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE ROBERTS COURT
deterrence hypothesis, we should begin with a normative point. Knowing
violations of the Constitution cannot be justified by police calculations of
costs and benefits. Suppose police have probable cause to believe that a
murder weapon can be found in a particular house, but they have no war-
rant to search. Suppose, further, that they know the house to be temporarily
unoccupied. Entry therefore would disturb no one. Suppose further that the
residents have left a window open, so that the police could enter without
doing any damage to property. The police have no warrant, but they are
confident one would be issued if they applied for one. They are also confi-
dent that their department would cheerfully pay whatever a tort suit might
cost to make a major case. Exclusion gives them an incentive not to enter-
is this over-deterrence?
The Supremacy Clause says no. Presumably the compelling-state-
interest safety valve applies in Fourth Amendment cases, so that if catas-
trophic consequences would follow from compliance with the usual consti-
tutional rules, the police might disregard those rules without violating the
Constitution. Congress can make a law authorizing censorship of the news
in wartime, the text of the First Amendment notwithstanding. In the Fourth
Amendment context, the compelling-state-interest doctrine might justify
city-wide searches, without particularized suspicion, for weapons of mass
destruction plausibly suspected to be concealed by terrorists. If, however,
we leave the compelling interest scenario aside, the police should do ex-
actly what the exclusionary rule encourages them to do-get a warrant,
even if this means that the evidence may disappear before it can be seized.
The same normative analysis applies to searches permitted by the
Constitution without warrants but only on condition of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion. Suppose 1000 cars are parked by a valet service for a
Rolling Stones concert. The police could, at negligible cost, seize the keys
from the service and search every vehicle. Does the Fourth Amendment
permit them to balance the costs of search against the value of evidence, or
does it rather balance those values independently of current policy prefer-
ences by requiring probable cause?
The position I am defending is different from the claim that the Fourth
Amendment establishes a property rule rather than a liability rule.29 I have
tried over the years to conceptualize the Fourth Amendment as a liability
rule or a property rule, but the private-law dichotomy does not easily trans-
pose to a constitutional limit on the public force. Indeed, because the prop-
erty/liability distinction turns on remedies rather than rights, the variety and
29. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
2010]
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controversy over Fourth Amendment remedies renders the private-law
distinction problematic in this context. Rather, the Fourth Amendment
protects particular individual interests against government encroachment
absent specified prerequisites. This substantive rule is protected by a mix of
remedies. Egregious violations are punishable by both criminal sanctions
30
and punitive civil damages. 31 Ongoing violations can be enjoined,32 even
when undertaken in good faith based on legal advice.
33
Professor Kontorovich makes a useful point by distinguishing slow-
moving from fast-moving Fourth Amendment events.34 Obviously enough,
in most cases, Fourth Amendment violations can be remedied only ex post,
typically by exclusion, damage actions, or both. To say that ex post reme-
dies are the only ones we have is not to say that the sanction for violations
should equal either the victim's loss or the violator's gain, because in the
Fourth Amendment context these are different.
There may be violations for which damages provide the best practical
remedy, but those damages are not, and should not, be limited by compen-
sation but rather set high enough to eliminate all but irrational incentives
for violation. Private law abhors holdouts and eccentrics; the Fourth
Amendment protects them. The government has no more right than, say,
Bill Gates to break into houses or lock people up with a cheerful willing-
ness to pay damages ex post.
What makes some knowing violations of the Fourth Amendment look
attractive is the failure of substantive doctrine to factor the seriousness of
the suspected offense into the determination of reasonableness. Professor
Stuntz has criticized the transsubstantive character of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. 35 Prevailing doctrine might be justified by the tendency of
30. E.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (appeal of sentence imposed following con-
viction of police officers accused of the Rodney King beating which was recorded on videotape).
31. E.g., Wilson v. Aquino, 233 F.App'x. 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding punitive damage judgment
for illegal body-cavity search).
32. E.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (enjoining search of hundreds of
homes based on arrest warrants for two individuals).
33. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2000); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32 (2000).
34. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis
of Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1178-79 (2005) (distinguishing warrant-clause cases
from reasonableness-clause cases, and arguing that latter cannot be litigated ex ante so that Fourth
Amendment should be understood as a liability rule). I find this analysis unsatisfying. For one thing,
administrative searches are analyzed under the reasonableness clause, not the warrant clause, but are
typically tested by suits for injunctive relief, as in the drug testing and roadblock cases. More funda-
mentally, the property/liability dichotomy does not tell us whether to choose compensatory or deterrent
measures for sanctions ex post. In, for example, a police homicide case like Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1 (1985), the only feasible remedy is ex post. It does not follow that the amount of damages should
be compensatory rather than punitive.
35. William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment,
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judges to consider offense severity in practice. However one resolves the
transsubstantive issue, the issue is one of substantive rather than remedial
law.
In the Fourth Amendment context, then, over-deterrence does not
mean that the monetized expected value of evidence that might be found
from illegal searches exceeds the expected damages to be paid for those
searches. The substantive constitutional provision has balanced the costs
and benefits of those searches quite differently. Over-deterrence of consti-
tutional violations therefore means discouraging lawful police actions in a
pool of cases where the legality of prospective actions is uncertain.
If we take the substantive Fourth Amendment law as given and worthy
of content-independent respect, it follows that the police should be trained
to refrain from searches and seizures whenever the proposed action is more
likely than not illegal. The reverse is not true; the police may often gain an
advantage by delaying a stop, search, or arrest for some time after they
have established legal grounds. The current remedial mix would over-deter
if, and only if, the police have a net incentive to refrain from searches and
seizures for other than tactical reasons even when the potential action is
probably legal.
2. Police Incentives
Police behavior on the street is the product of a long sequence of
agency relationships. Voters elect a municipal government, the government
establishes a police force, and the administrators in charge of the force train
its officers and reinforce this training by rewarding compliance and punish-
ing noncompliance. A brief look at the relationship between officers on the
street, whose conduct is the actus reus of any Fourth Amendment violation,
suggests that the focus of policy analysis should be on police administra-
tors.
Individual officers do not internalize either the benefits or the costs of
Fourth Amendment activity. 36 When the police apprehend an offender, they
may improve their performance evaluations and gain prestige within the
force. They do not, however, pocket what the community is willing to pay
to prosecute and punish the offender.
Nor do individual officers internalize the costs of Fourth Amendment
activity. The police get paid whether or not they are deployed to their high-
est use. If police seize evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
114 HARV. L. REv. 842 (2001).
36. See Jeffries, supra note 18, at 267.
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evidence may be suppressed, but the police are not automatically fined or
jailed. Although the practice is somewhat subterranean, cities and depart-
ments apparently pay for the defense of lawsuits against individual officers,
and, when the individuals are liable, indemnify the individual officers for
the cost of damages or settlements. 37 Individuals therefore do not internal-
ize (or expect to internalize) these costs.
38
So the law influences street-level behavior primarily by giving police
administrators incentives to train and discipline the force to comply with
constitutional requirements. Call whoever is in charge of the police the
employer, R. Let us assume that R is rational actor with an incentive to
maximize measurable indicia of crime control (arrests, clearance rates,
convictions, reductions in reported crimes, maybe even victimization sur-
vey numbers). Let us further assume that R is obligated, by contract or
custom, to defend and indemnify employees against civil rights actions.
Built into this model is an important and nonobvious assumption. The
model assumes that R has no content-independent respect for law. If R has
a taste for complying with formal legal prescriptions, R will train and dis-
cipline the force to be more compliant than the model predicts. The as-
sumption is debatable but in my view justified by the available
information.39
R will train and discipline the force NOT to act unless:
EB > EC
Where EB is R's expected benefit from action and EC is R's expected cost.
EB, the expected benefit, can be broken down into non-evidentiary benefits
(NEB) and evidentiary benefits (EVB). NEB includes such gains as dis-
couraging crime by visible patrol presence or preventing domestic violence
37. Id.
38. See id. ("[I]n cases of flagrant misconduct (of the sort that might trigger criminal prosecution),
a government might cut its employee loose, but it is hard to imagine a case of simple search and seizure
(unaccompanied by assault or other grievous harm) provoking that reaction. Thus, although government
officers cannot capture the social benefits of their actions, neither do they pay the full costs.").
39. The political incentives facing public officials responsible for the police are distinctly tilted in
favor of security over liberty. I remain convinced of the basic soundness of the position I advanced in
1993. See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice, or,
Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079
(1993). For a more recent resume of the supporting argument, see Donald A. Dripps, Justice Harlan on
Criminal Procedure: Two Cheers for the Legal Process School, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 125 (2005).
Professor Rosenthal, in distinguishing public from private liability-based incentives, seems to agree that
sanction that might be optimal from the perspective of a private firm may be inadequate to ensure
constitutional compliance by public entities. See Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental
Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 842-43 (2007)
("Even aside from political opportunity costs, liability-producing conduct may have political benefits
that offset the deterrent effect of liability. To use Professor Levinson's example, a program of aggres-
sive stop-and-frisk of young males in high-crime areas may increase liability, but it also may pay such
handsome political benefits that liability will have no deterrent effect.").
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by arresting the abusive boyfriend. EVB includes the gain from enabling
prosecutions based on evidence expected from a prospective action.
EC can be broken down into opportunity cost (OC) and liability cost
(LC). Once the funds are appropriated to pay for the force, the cost of those
funds is fixed. The force itself, however, can be deployed in different ways.
Police engaged in routine patrol could be working undercover drug opera-
tions or gang investigations. The size of OC depends on the expected bene-
fits from the next-best use (NBU) that might be made with the quantity of
resources (QR) devoted to any given operation.
R has an incentive to deploy the force to its highest uses measured by
whatever combination of crime-control measures R adopts. The next-best
use for marginal police resources is the value of R's highest unmet prior-
ity-which is small enough that given R's budget constraint that priority is
not addressed at all. The size of OC therefore to some extent depends on
whether the police face a target-rich or target-poor environment. OC will
be greatest when a police operation consumes large resources in a target-
rich environment and smallest when the operation consumes modest re-
sources in a target-poor environment.
The primary effect of the exclusionary rule is to reduce EVB. If the
police are certain that a proposed search will be held legal, EVB is un-
changed. If the police are certain that it will be held illegal, EVB is reduced
to zero. In uncertain cases, if evidence is found, there will be a probability
of exclusion; call it PX. The effect of the exclusionary rule is to multiply
EVB by (1 - PX).
The risk of exclusion also changes the opportunity cost term because
one cost of a search is the risk that the evidence will be discovered at a time
when the police lack probable cause or reasonable suspicion but could have
established it later had they delayed and sought additional supporting in-
formation. This cost-the normatively relevant cost of exclusion-is re-
duced, but not eliminated, by the inevitable discovery exception. The
inevitable discovery exception requires proof by a preponderance that the
tainted evidence would have been found later and lawfully but for the pre-
mature police intervention.40 In some cases the evidence would have been
found later and lawfully but the prosecution will not be able to prove this.
This cost is genuine, but given the inevitable discovery exception, and the
readiness of judges to make the required finding, I will treat it as negligi-
ble.41
40. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984).
41. See Dripps,supra note 15, at 2.
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So viewed the exclusionary rule is less a penalty for police illegality
than a bounty for legality. This bounty can influence police behavior be-
cause the opportunity costs and liability risks of action may outweigh the
non-evidentiary benefits but not the total benefits of action. The exclusion-
ary rule reduces the expected evidentiary benefit in direct proportion to the
probable unlawfulness of the prospective search or seizure.
LC has two components, the probability of damages (PD) and the
quantity of damages expected (QD). We can now describe the incentives
facing R by the equation:
NEB + (EVB * (1 - PX) > (QR * NBU) + (PD * QD))
The police should act only when they expect the gains, discounted by the
risk of exclusion, to outweigh the opportunity cost plus the risk of dam-
ages.
The present remedial mix would be over-deterring if PX, PD, and QD
are high enough to eliminate the expected net benefit from searches that are
probably legal and otherwise cost-beneficial according to R's utility func-
tion. If this were true, we would expect the police to refrain from justifiable
but borderline searches by choosing to intervene only when the legality of
their actions is highly probable. I think this hypothesis can be tested against
empirical evidence on the success rates of different types of searches.
Fourth Amendment law's primary requirement is of some level of an-
tecedent suspicion. Searches for evidence can only be justified by probable
cause. Investigative stops can only be justified by reasonable suspicion. If
we could agree on numbers for probable cause and reasonable suspicion,
and if we knew the success rates the police were encountering in a large
sample of cases, we would have some evidence bearing on the over-
deterrence hypothesis. If hit rates were substantially higher than the pre-
scribed level of antecedent probability, police would be refraining from
high-probability searches.
It might be the case that hit rates are so high that the likely explanation
would be that police action was limited not by the legal rules but by re-
source constraints. That seems implausible. Clearance rates for the index
crimes are in the vicinity of 20%.42 That suggests not only a target-rich
environment (a high rate of offenses relative to police resources) but also
that the targets are not easy to hit. Police searching at random would not
discover a great deal of evidence. If hit rates are high, it is because OC and
LC are high relative to NEV and (EV * 1 - PX).
42. See id.
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3. Testing the Over-deterrence Hypothesis
Has the current remedial mix had a chilling effect on police actions
that are probably legal? This seems improbable, both from the incentives
created by the current mix and from what direct evidence we have of police
behavior. When police action is of debatable legality, the immunity defense
insulates the officer from liability, and thereby the employer from indemni-
fication. Exclusion reduces but does not eliminate the value of borderline
actions, as police administrators probably derive considerable utility from
seizing drugs and weapons even if these may not be used in court.
The exceptions to exclusion of tainted evidence are one reason.43 The
standing rule in particular means that the police can rationally anticipate
some legal benefit from illegal searches when group criminality is sus-
pected. When the police illegally seize contraband, the drugs or guns are
off the streets even if they cannot be used as evidence. Many, probably
most, arrests are made with no expectation of discovering evidence in the
incidental search.
If the adjudication of suppression motions frequently resulted in false
positives-erroneous findings that the police had acted illegally--exclusion
might discourage borderline but lawful actions. If errors are distributed
randomly, however, police administrators would expect false positives to
be balanced by false negatives. In all probability, false negatives are more
likely than false positives. Sympathetic judges and police perjury reduce
the probability that evidence illegally seized in fact will be ruled so in
court.
This assessment of the legal incentives facing police decision makers
is consistent with the most plausible empirical test of over- or under-
deterrence. The literature contains a considerable number of studies meas-
uring the success rates of different types of searches and seizures. We can
compare the "hit rate" with the level of antecedent suspicion the law re-
quires for each species of search-and-seizure.
If the hit rate is clearly above the legally required zone of ex ante
43.
The combined effect of exceptions to the rule and restrictions on collateral review has been to
leave exclusion of illegally seized evidence primarily in the hands of state courts. There
surely are differences among states in the administration of the Fourth Amendment, but those
differences are unlikely to affect egregious cases. Few object to suppression of evidence for
flagrant illegality. Difficulties arise in borderline cases, where the mere fact that the constable
blundered seems an inadequate reason to set the criminal free. One suspects that many courts
in many places strain to avoid that result. Yet it is precisely in the context of the borderline
mistake, the everyday close call that should have been made differently, that alternative
remedies are hardest to find.
Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 27, at 1407 (footnotes omitted).
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probability in a large sample, we could infer either very high opportunity
costs (a police force so small relative to offenses that it can process only
high-probability cases, quite aside from remedies for legal violations) or
over-deterrence (the police have the capability to engage in high-
probability searches but refrain because of the fear of exclusion and dam-
ages). If, by contrast, the hit rate is clearly below the legally required zone
of ex ante probability, we could infer either very low opportunity costs (the
police have so many resources relative to offenses that only low-probability
cases are left to pursue) or under-deterrence (the police engage in lots of
low-probability, and therefore unlawful, searches because the benefits of
even low-probability cases exceed the costs).
Prior exclusionary rule research, and more recent research on racial
profiling, has given us some evidence of the hit rates for, respectively,
search warrants for private premises; warrantless vehicle searches during
traffic stops based on probable cause under Ross and Acevedo; and Terry
stops of citizens on the streets. The evidence is not as extensive as might be
wished, but it is evidence, as distinct from mere conjecture of the sort set
forth by the Hudson majority. Let us look at what we know about warrant
searches, warrantless automobile searches, and Terry stops.
a. Warrant Searches
The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause to issue a search war-
rant. The Supreme Court has resisted quantifying probable cause, 44 but the
governing idea in the cases is that probable cause is present when the ex-
pected probability of success exceeds 50%, while a lower probability may
sometimes suffice. The Supreme Court has read the amendment to require
warrants for some searches, primarily entry of homes without consent.
The warrant requirement increases OC, because, aside from the collec-
tion of the information showing probable cause, the preparation of the ap-
plication and the process of presenting the application to a judge both
44. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) ("The probable-cause standard is incapable
of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends
on the totality of the circumstances. We have stated, however, that '[t]he substance of all the definitions
of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,' . . . and that the belief of guilt must be
particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.")
In the leading case, Illinois v. Gates, the Court equated probable cause with a "fair probabil-
ity." 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). One might argue that less likely than not is improbable and so no prob-
ability at all, fair or foul. On the other hand, in Pringle, the majority shied away from any numerical
expression of required probability. 540 U.S. at 371. Probably the best that can be said is that the prob-
able cause standard is "a relatively high level of certainty akin to a more-likely-than-not standard."
Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L.J. 139, 150 (2005).
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consume significant amounts of police time.45 Search warrants have little
NEB; police applying for a warrant are motivated by the desire to obtain
admissible evidence. We should therefore expect that the police will seek
warrants only when EVB is high-above the rough-and-ready 50% hit rate
that would satisfy the probable cause standard.
In 1972, Michael Rebell found that 64% and 70% of search warrants
executed in two different years in the same Connecticut jurisdiction re-
sulted in the seizure of some of the target evidence. 46 A study for the Na-
tional Center for State Courts examined warrant practice in seven cities and
found that the success rate for warrant searches (based on returns filed that
listed that some of the target evidence was seized) ranged from 79% to
93% in six of the seven cities studied.47 More recently, a study by Laurence
Benner and Charles Samarkos of search warrants issued by state courts in
San Diego found that 65% of the executed warrants authorizing searches
for illegal drugs resulted in the seizures of the target evidence. 48
Warrant searches succeed at a rate that matches or exceeds the hit rate
prescribed by the applicable legal standard. Does this suggest over-
deterrence? Probably not. The numbers for success have not changed dra-
matically since United States v. Leon, 49 even if the quality of the applica-
tions may have suffered. Leon and Malley v. Briggs50 mandate that a
defective warrant, absent gross ignorance or deliberate perjury on the part
of the police, will trigger neither exclusion nor damages. The likely expla-
nation for the high rate of success for searches pursuant to warrants is op-
portunity cost. Quite aside from the remedial mix of damages and
exclusion, which have been withdrawn from warrant searches absent the
most egregious facts, police who seek and execute warrants are interested
in evidence and generally have probable cause.
If we view the warrant requirement solely as a means to the end of as-
certaining probable cause in the most rational way, hit rates over 50%
would indeed suggest over-deterrence. There is, however, no exception to
45. See Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 926-27 (1986).
46. Michael A. Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A Search for
Meaningful Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703, 723 (1972).
47. RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL, NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS:
PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 50 tbl.2-19 (1985). These percentages were obtained
by taking the percentage of searches in cases in which returns were filed that led to seizure of some item
named in the warrant and multiplying that percentage by the percentage of warrants for which returns
were in fact filed. Id. at 46, 50 tbl.2-19.
48. Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego: Prelimi-
nary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221, 249 (2000).
49. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
50. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
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either the substantive right or the exclusionary remedy when police act
without a warrant even though probable cause is clearly present. It would
seem to follow that the warrant process has additional purposes, including
that of putting a costly hurdle between the police and the most sensitive
Fourth Amendment interests-the privacy of the home and of confidential
communications.5 1
The remedial mix enters the warrant context by framing the opportu-
nity cost issue. Why would the police bother with the costly warrant proc-
ess? Because the remedial mix makes bypassing warrants too costly.
Search warrants are usually sought for home invasions and electronic sur-
veillance. Absent consent or exigency, which the courts have been pretty
scrupulous about with respect to home searches, the police know that home
invasion requires a warrant. Judges facing a motion to suppress for a war-
rantless home search are willing to suppress and may feel no real choice
about the matter. Citizens whose homes have been invaded may well bring
suit, and police who enter homes without warrants are not likely to win on
the immunity defense.
So it is not implausible-but all things considered probably incor-
rect-to say that the success rate for warrant searches should be near the
50% number the probable cause standard might suggest. To the extent that
the Fourth Amendment requires the police to get warrants based on prob-
able cause, the constitutionally-prescribed hit rate is higher than what we
would expect if the Fourth Amendment required only probable cause. The
warrant requirement adds the cost of the warrant process to the requirement
for home invasions, not just as a matter of police tactics but as a matter of
the Fourth Amendment's constitutional trump over ordinary policy consid-
erations. Given the legal requirement of both probable cause and a (costly)
warrant, we should expect the hit rates from warrant searches to be some-
what above the 50% threshold-which is where it turns out that they are.
Only if the costs to police of obtaining warrants were reduced to zero
would we expect the hit rate to be 50%.
If hit rates for warrant searches are thought too high, the curtailment
of both exclusionary and damage remedies for searches authorized by war-
rants suggests that the "culprit" is the cost of the warrant process. Action to
reduce that cost to the police might move the hit rate closer to the 50% rate
we might expect from a perfect assessment of probable cause ex ante.
Abolition of the exclusionary rule means that the police would enjoy
51. See Stuntz, supra note 35, at 848 ("[R]equiring a warrant is a good thing if, but only if, the
substantive standard applied to the search would otherwise be too low-if, that is, police will be too
quick to search unless they are forced to get a warrant.").
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the full evidentiary benefit of illegal warrantless home invasions. There are
two possible scenarios. If the specter of tort liability is strong enough, noth-
ing will change. No extra evidence will be discovered (and so much for the
exclusionary rule's social costs!). If, however, admissibility of the evidence
changes the balance of incentives so that the risk of tort liability is deemed
worth the cost of a search that both the training department and the execut-
ing officers know is illegal, evidence will be obtained but only by treating
the Constitution as unworthy of content-independent respect.
Both scenarios would play out. When the police expect the search vic-
tim to lack the means, the pluck, or the equities predictive of success in tort
to actually sue, warrantless home invasions, a' la Mapp, would flourish.
Evidence of crimes by the wealthy, well-educated, and politically-
connected would be just as inaccessible to justice as with the exclusionary
rule.
b. Warrantless Searches
Warrantless searches for evidence, independent of arrests, occur al-
most exclusively in the context of automobiles. For these searches the po-
lice need probable cause but not a warrant. Prior to the racial profiling
controversy, warrantless searches were hard to study. Police executing a
warrant are obligated to make a return to the court, creating a documentary
record. No such record typically accompanies a warrantless search.
Now, however, we have some data on auto searches, developed to ad-
dress the controversy over racial profiling. Much of this data concerns the
initial decision to stop, rather than the later decision to search. When hit
rates for stops are reported, the search might be based on consent or an
incident to arrest rather than as a free-standing search for evidence based
on probable cause. It is difficult to parse the data to find hit rates for this
particular species of police behavior.
Sam Gross and Katherine Barnes carefully analyzed data collected by
the Maryland State Police. 52 These officers were required to report traffic
stops and subsequent searches and to identify when the search was based
on consent. Treating all non-consent searches as based on a claim of prob-
able cause, they found the hit rate for these latter searches to be just under
48.4%. 53 Again, at least superficially, that is about where the law says it
ought to be.
Gross and Barnes point out two reasons to think that the Maryland
52. Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction
on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REv. 651, 662-70 (2002).
53. Id. at 674 tbl.9.
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data overstate the hit rate-perhaps dramatically. First, the police disliked
the reporting requirement and were, one supposes, far more likely to report
hits than misses. 54 Second, when the data are parsed for the importance of
the evidence seized, the overall hit rate is far less impressive. If we factor
out trace and personal quantities of marijuana, the hit rate for Maryland
probable-cause searches falls to 9.8%.55
Now of course possessing marijuana for personal use is a crime. It is
not, one supposes, what the police were looking for. A bigger reason to
discount the hit rate, however, follows from the fact that in many cases
probable cause for the vehicle search is derived from discovery in plain
view (or plain smell) of a personal supply of marijuana. In these cases, the
search shows up in the overall statistics as a hit, even though the probable-
cause based search discovered nothing at all.
If the primary mission of the police who make traffic stops is traffic
enforcement, the opportunity cost of the time added to each stop by a thor-
ough search of the vehicle is high. Traffic violations are ubiquitous, the
state gains revenue from citations, and the police have incentives to issue
those citations. In a study of the North Carolina state police, William Smith
and his colleagues found that troopers on patrol for speeding or other traffic
infractions almost never searched and were loath to do so. 56
If, however, the primary police mission is drug interdiction, OC is
lower. Undercover investigations to build a record for warrant searches are
time-consuming and dangerous. Sell-and-bust operations are easier but net
only ordinary users. LC for the search, independent of the stop, is low.
Qualified immunity means that liability attaches only to police who are
clearly mistaken about the probable cause issue, and reasonable people can
often disagree about whether probable cause is present or not. Damages for
an illegal roadside search are not likely to be high.
So, for warrantless searches, the remedy with the most influence on
police behavior is the exclusionary rule. Gross and Barnes' numbers on
their face suggest no over-deterrence. Regarded realistically, they suggest
some degree of under-deterrence.
54. Id. at 679 ("[Troopers] very likely did distort the records in these data by simply failing to
report unsuccessful searches, a type of conduct that is also familiar from reports in New Jersey and New
York.") (footnotes omitted).
55. Id. at 700 tbl.14. The 9.8% figure is obtained by adding the 3.7% hit rate for small dealers to
the 6.1% hit rate for medium/large dealers.
56. WILLIAM R. SMITH ET AL., THE NORTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY TRAFFIC STUDY, FINAL REPORT
TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 157 (2003), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/204021.pdf ("The regular road troopers we talked to were not
enthusiastic about searches in the least, and it is clear that they view unnecessary searches, in general,
as a nonproductive use of their time.").
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c. Terry Stops
Under Terry v. Ohio57 and its progeny, the police may detain a suspi-
cious person for investigation if they have what the cases call "reasonable
suspicion" to believe he is engaged in criminal activity. If the courts have
been reluctant to quantify probable cause, they have been even less willing
to quantify reasonable suspicion. The officer is said to need "a reasonable
suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be
afoot.' 58 An anonymous tip corroborated only by police observation of
innocent details in the tip falls short of this standard.59 Presence on the
streets in a high-crime neighborhood, coupled with flight from the police
on sight, is enough. 60 If the police are justified in stopping the suspect, they
may conduct a protective pat-down search for weapons if specific facts are
present to suggest that the suspect might be dangerous.
The opportunity cost of these street encounters is relatively low. The
police are still present on the street, and if they hear gunfire or someone
shouting "Stop, Thief." they can abandon their speculative encounter and
address the emergency. At the scene of their deployment they produce the
non-evidentiary benefits of a visible patrol presence, but unless they stop
people they will have no evidentiary gains unless they see an offense in
flagrante. From a crime-control standpoint, they have an incentive to stop
and frisk the most suspicious person in the area, regardless of just how
suspicious that individual happens to be.
Liability risk for Terry stops is also low. Because the governing law is
expressed as a standard ("reasonable suspicion") rather than a rule (for
example, no entry of private premises is permitted without a warrant, con-
sent, or emergency), the qualified immunity defense protects all but the
most egregious violations. Damages from an encounter measured in min-
utes are not likely to be large. So, as with warrantless searches, the primary
incentive to comply with the reasonable suspicion standard is the exclu-
sionary rule.
If the police have enough evidence ex ante to make an arrest, they
have no need for the Terry procedure. There is a small probability that the
suspect will admit criminal activity. While there may be some crime-
control benefit from hassling suspected gangsters in public view or dis-
57. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
58. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
59. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 267-68 (2000).
60. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000).
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suading a suspect from a planned but never consummated offense, a major
reason for these stops is the prospect of discovering drugs or guns. The
exclusionary rule's role here is definite but limited. If the police act unlaw-
fully they may lose their case, but the drugs or guns will still be off the
streets.
Like warrantless searches, Terry stops were hard to study before the
racial profiling controversy. That controversy, however, induced several
jurisdictions to require police to keep records of search-and-seizure activ-
ity, including Maryland and North Carolina as discussed above. The New
York Police Department (NYPD) has been recording on-the-sidewalk
Terry stops since the 1990's. A recent RAND study of half a million re-
ported Terry stops by the NYPD found that only 10% of these stops re-
sulted in either an arrest or a citation.61
The NYPD employs an aggressive version of community policing,
and so we might expect the New York City hit rate to be uncharacteristi-
cally low. If, however, we are interested in the influence of Fourth
Amendment remedies, we are interested in how far an aggressive depart-
ment feels free to go before the costs exceed the gains. The NYPD believes
that neither the exclusionary rule nor the tort remedy eliminates the net
benefits from Terry stops with a 10% hit rate. The reporting requirement
that made the New York data possible, moreover, increases OC for stops.
We might well expect the hit rate to be lower in jurisdictions with compa-
rable police tactics but no reporting requirement. Unless reasonable suspi-
cion means something like an outside chance, the remedial mix is under-
deterring illegal Terry stops.
The RAND data shed some interesting light on the frisk part of stop-
and-frisk. The data show that the police frisked only a minority, roughly a
third, of those stopped.62 This may be a reporting artifact but that seems
improbable given that in the other two-thirds of these cases the police did
bother to fill out the form recording the stop itself. The hit rate for these
frisks is quite low, with some contraband being recovered in between 5.4%
and 6.4% of frisks. 63 The numbers vary a bit across racial groups, but
across groups, roughly speaking, one percent of frisks recovered a
weapon.64
Some contraband was recovered in 6.4% of frisks of whites, 5.7% of
61. GREG RIDGEWAY, ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPART-
MENT'S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES xi, xv (2007).
62. Id. at 37 (Table 5.2).
63. Id. at41-42.
64. Id. at 42.
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blacks, and 5.4% of Hispanics. 65 The recoveries were primarily of drugs:
"For every 1,000 frisks of black suspects, officers recovered seven weap-
ons; for every 1,000 frisks of similarly situated white suspects, they recov-
ered eight weapons, a difference that is not statistically significant.
' '66
What can we learn from these numbers? The very low rate at which
the police recover weapons stands to reason. They face an immediate, per-
sonal, and potentially infinite cost if the suspect resorts to lethal resistance.
The finding that the police are not frisking almost every suspect stopped is
somewhat surprising. In any event, it seems that if the police do fear armed
resistance, the exclusionary rule is unlikely to influence their behavior.
The substantive law makes weapons but not drugs fair objects of the
so-called protective search. If the exclusionary rule creates incentives that
trump officer safety, over-deterring justified frisks for weapons, we would
expect to see much higher hit rates for weapons. The six or seven to one
ratio of drugs to weapons recovered might mean that the police often frisk
the suspect not because they subjectively fear for their safety (the only
legally-cognizable ground for a frisk) but because they hope to discover
illegal drugs. If this is the reality the numbers reflect, the current remedial
mix would be under- rather than over-deterring.
d. Police Brutality
The worst forms of unconstitutional police misconduct-police brutal-
ity-have no EVB, and so the exclusionary rule has no direct disincentive
effect. Brutality does have a relatively high LC. There is enough police
brutality to doubt that the tort sanction is over-deterring it (recall that when
illegality is certain there is no risk of over-deterrence), as "[t]he national
average among large police departments for excessive-force complaints is
9.5 per 100 full-time officers."'67 However one regards the present
tort/crime/discipline remedial mix for police brutality, the exclusionary rule
debate is largely irrelevant to the brutality problem. Abolition might signal
carte blanche to the police and thereby encourage brutality by implication.
In a rational actor model, however, abolition of the exclusionary rule would
not change training or discipline with respect to police violence.
65. Id. at41-42.
66. Id. at 42.
67. Susan Saulny, Chicago Police Abuse Cases Exceed Average, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at
A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/1 1/15/us/15chicago.html. Some complaints are false,
but many citizens decline to complain because they expect no action or fear reprisal.
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e. Arrests
As with police brutality, the exclusionary rule has little to do with po-
lice incentives. Evidentiary benefit is no consideration at all in most arrests.
Arrests are infrequently an instrument of investigation and far more often
the end-stage product. In theft and buy-and-bust drug cases, the police hope
to find incriminating evidence at the time of arrest, but the bulk of arrests
reflect other police incentives.
Warrants for nonappearance are a substantial fraction of arrests. In
flagrante arrests, whether for purse-snatching, public intoxication, or solici-
tation of prostitution, are another substantial percentage. Arrests to sup-
press immediate violence, especially domestic violence, are yet another
significant fraction. From a departmental perspective, the expected value of
arrests is almost all non-evidentiary. Either the police already have the
evidence they need, or the arrest is made for social control purposes other
than initiating a prosecution in court.
The exception is the so-called pretextual arrest, where the police make
an arrest because they have broader search powers incident to the arrest
than they have based on the probable cause or reasonable suspicion stan-
dards. In these cases, rules that clearly limit the scope of the search incident
tend to discourage pretextual arrests when the suspected evidence is outside
the permitted zone of search and tend to encourage pretextual arrests when
the suspected evidence is in that zone.
The predicate arrest must be based on probable cause, but no warrant
is required except when the police need to force entry into private premises
to effect the arrest. We can look to case attrition studies-studies of "lost
arrests"--to see how many arrests end in conviction, and thereby construct
a sort of "hit rate" for arrests. While the figures vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, the figure generally accepted is that half of all arrests result in
a conviction and half do not. The most recent numbers are a little lower
than that.68 That sounds like probable cause, right on the screws.
Whether too high, too low, or just right, current case attrition figures
probably are not due to the Fourth Amendment remedies mix. Tort liability
for false arrest is part of the cost side of the equation, but drastically limited
by qualified immunity. In some atypical cases--drug cases and perhaps a
68. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that in 2004, the most recent data available, there were
1,100,210 arrests for selected serious felonies in the state systems, but only 466,480, or just over 42%,
resulted in convictions. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS ONLINE, tbl.5.0002.2004, available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t500022004.pdf. This table lists the offenses differently; I
generated my number by summing the arrests and convictions across all offenses listed.
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few others-the police hope to discover some evidence incident to the ar-
rest, and in these cases, the exclusionary rule may have some influence as
well. If this remedial mix were over-deterring, we would expect to see sub-
stantially lower case attrition rates; that is to say, we would expect the po-
lice to concentrate resources in cases where probable cause is clear rather
than borderline. It seems more likely that Fourth Amendment remedies
have negligible influence on arrests and that police behavior is explicable
largely in terms of opportunity cost.
When the police apply for an arrest warrant as part of an ongoing in-
vestigation, the opportunity cost, in terms of lost police time, resembles
that of obtaining a search warrant but is generally smaller. Bench warrants
are not sought by the police, and in any event, most arrests are not author-
ized by warrant ex ante. The opportunity cost of an arrest is the time it
takes for the police to find, subdue, and transport the offender before hand-
ing him off to the court system's lockup and writing a report.
The opportunity cost of search warrants is measured in days. The op-
portunity cost of an arrest is measured in fractions of an hour but is still
significant. If arrest neither serves immediate social control purposes, nor
initiates a promising prosecution, police administrators have reasons to
train the force to remain at work on proactive patrol or investigating re-
ported offenses.
f Summary of the Evidence on the Over-deterrence Hypothesis
The evidence available suggests that the current remedial mix is doing
a passable job with respect to home invasions, where the rule-type warrant
requirement forces the police into the costly warrant process. The evidence
further suggests that, when the opportunity cost for unlawful searches or
seizures is low, the current mix is not adequately deterring unlawful police
actions governed solely by standards like probable cause and reasonable
suspicion. This should concern civil libertarians, but there seems little
cause to criticize the current remedial mix for discouraging lawful searches
and seizures.
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B. Does a Majority of the Court Believe the Counter-Factual Over-
deterrence Thesis?
The Hudson majority's concern with the exclusionary rule's "substan-
tial social costs" is at odds with the over-deterrence thesis. Perhaps most
telling is the frequency with which the courts rely on exceptions to the
exclusionary rule to admit evidence obtained in violation of constitutional
requirements. If the tort sanction were deterring such violations, the exclu-
sionary rule could not exact those "substantial social costs," and there
wouldn't be a great deal of tainted evidence available under exceptions to
exclusion. There wouldn't be many Fourth Amendment violations to sup-
port suppression motions. A judiciary that wanted to eliminate the exclu-
sionary rule without encouraging violations of the Constitution would not
do so de jure, but de facto, by crafting effective alternative remedies that
made exclusion too rare to care about.
That course, exemplified by eliminating the judge-made qualified im-
munity defense, really does run the risk of over-deterrence. Given the
prevalence of indemnification of individual officers, and the Supreme
Court's extensive recognition of bright-line rules, tort liability sans immu-
nity and sans exclusion might move us closer to optimal deterrence. Given
the disconnect between tort damages and the expected gain from aggressive
policing, we would also have to consider the possibility that such a regime
would either under-deter (if, for example, low damages for arbitrary Terry
stops gave police general search powers of citizens on the streets) or over-
deter (if extravagant juries brought back awards high enough to discourage
the police from acting in all but clearly legal cases).
Abolishing the exclusionary rule without also strengthening other
remedies would be as radical a change of the current remedial mix as abol-
ishing qualified immunity. The justices in the Hudson majority, however,
do not seem to regard the current mix of Fourth Amendment remedies as
broken. As we have seen, if the current remedial mix is defective, it is be-
cause it gives too little disincentive to engage in unconstitutional searches
and seizures with low opportunity costs, especially when the governing law
is a standard like probable cause or reasonable suspicion. And if it ain't
broke, don't fix it.
That, at any rate, seems to be the upshot of Justice Kennedy's separate
opinion. Having joined the exclusionary-rule bashing section of the major-
ity opinion, Justice Kennedy then wrote separately to distance himself from
abolition, stating that "the continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as
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settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt."'69 The cynical might
wonder why, if the current operation of the exclusionary rule were not in
doubt, such a declaration would be required. Nonetheless, the tenor of Jus-
tice Kennedy's concurrence matches that of the majority: Regulation of the
police in this country in a tolerable balance. Regardless of the merits of that
proposition, it is not a proposition that sounds the clarion call for any radi-
cal change.
C. The Supreme Court's Power over Search-and-Seizure
The exclusionary rule may survive for another reason. The operation
of the exclusionary rule brings most Fourth Amendment issues into court,
including the Supreme Court of the United States. Damage actions depend
on the victim having the gumption to sue and are subject to the qualified
immunity defense. One charged with an offense has every incentive to raise
Fourth Amendment challenges and will also have counsel to raise the chal-
lenge. Hitherto, good faith has not precluded suppression motions for war-
rantless police actions.
In the past ten years, the Supreme Court has decided only a handful of
Fourth Amendment issues in the context of tort suits against the police. If
we leave aside a cluster of cases raising issues about the manner of execut-
ing a valid warrant, only four damage actions against police have provided
vehicles for formulating substantive Fourth Amendment law during this
period.70 Also during this period, the Court has decided roughly thirty
Fourth Amendment cases arising from motions to suppress.
To some extent, this record reflects the rarity with which aggrieved
citizens have the will to bring suit. The qualified immunity defense also
surely plays a role. Attorneys may discourage plaintiffs likely to lose a
summary judgment based on immunity. The Court's ruling in Saucier v.
Katz,71 encouraging an advisory opinion on the merits of the constitutional
issue followed by summary judgment based on the immunity defense, rec-
ognizes the problem but does not solve it (which explains why the Court
69. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (holding that Fourth
Amendment did not prohibit arrest of Terry stop suspect who failed to produce identification as re-
quired by state law); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (holding that particular description in an
application did not cure complete failure to particularize in the warrant itself); Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (holding that Fourth Amendment permits warrantless arrest for non-jailable
misdemeanors); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (holding that injuries to third
parties arising out of high-speed chase by police do not qualify as Fourth Amendment "seizures").
71. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
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recently receded from the Saucier holding in Pearson v. Callahan).72 The
courts can only rule on the merits if someone brings a suit, and people who
expect to lose on immunity grounds have no reason to supply the Court
with vehicles for judicial law-making. Such empirical evidence as there is
suggests considerable reluctance to bring suits.
73
Consider, as an example, the rules now in place limiting the scope of
the search incident to arrest. In his concurring opinion in Thornton v.
United States,74 Justice Scalia himself forcefully criticized the search-
incident-to-arrest rule of Belton v. New York.75 In search-incident cases, the
arrest itself is lawful; the question is whether the police exceeded the scope
of their incidental search power. Defendants incriminated by such searches
may have an incentive to seek a modification in prevailing law, even if also
pressing alternative theories.
What tort plaintiff is going to sue police for a search-incident that
complied with the existing Belton rule? The trial court has no choice but to
grant summary judgment. If, miraculously, a plaintiff overcame this obsta-
cle and won a ruling narrowing the Belton rule, what damages might she
expect from the police rummaging through a gym bag in the back seat of
her car, given the legality of the arrest?
Abolishing the exclusionary rule would transfer power over search-
and-seizure from the Court to state courts and legislatures. In states retain-
ing a state-law exclusionary rule, state courts would become the source of
law regulating the police, as they adjudicate suppression motions based on
state-constitutional search-and-seizure claims. In the federal system and
those states without a state-level exclusionary rule, legislatures would have
the power to set standards for police behavior.
72. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) (receding from Saucier and holding that courts have discretion to decide
Fourth Amendment issue before deciding qualified immunity issue). The effect of this ruling on the
Supreme Court's power over Fourth Amendment issues became apparent almost immediately. For
example, in Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, the Court held that the strip search of a
student by public school officials violated the Fourth Amendment before holding that the responsible
officials were protected by the immunity defense. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009)
73. See Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The
Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719
(1988). Schwab and Eisenberg studied case filings and outcomes in three federal district courts. They
found remarkably few suits against the police given the volume of search-and-seizure activity:
Interestingly, Table V reveals a modest number of nonprisoner actions against the police, yet
constitutional tort actions figure prominently in the debate about alternative mechanisms for
enforcing the fourth amendment. Crude extrapolation from Table V suggests that nonprison-
ers annually file roughly 2,000 constitutional tort actions against the police in federal court.
This must be a tiny fraction of all contested fourth amendment issues.
Id. at 735 (footnotes omitted).
74. 541 U.S. 615, 625-33 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
75. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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The Court consistently has jealously guarded its power over criminal
procedure. For example, in Michigan v. Long, the majority ruled that state-
constitutional rights provide an independent state ground for granting a
suppression motion only when the state court explicitly invokes the state
constitution.76 The standard constitutional law avoidance canon points in
the opposite direction; the federal court should avoid a constitutional ruling
if at all possible and should attempt to preserve the result of the state deci-
sion if at all possible.
A more famous example is Dickerson v. United States, in which the
majority rebuffed an attempt by Congress to repudiate Miranda by stat-
ute.77 Chief Justice Rehnquist, hardly Miranda's most likely defender,
seemed more hostile to a legislative incursion onto judicial turf than sym-
pathetic to the right to remain silent. 78
In the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has (and has regularly
exercised) the option of reducing the "costs" of the exclusionary rule by
changing the content of the substantive law in favor of the government. It
would lose this option in a world without the exclusionary rule. Police de-
fendants who have engaged in clearly illegal conduct are likely to settle
rather than appeal to the Supreme Court hoping for a change in the law.
Simply from the standpoint of preserving institutional prerogatives, it
seems unlikely that a majority of the justices would surrender their substan-
tial power over a major issue.
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AS PHOENIX
Prior to Mapp, police in states without exclusionary rules ignored the
search-and-seizure provisions of their state constitutions and the formal
applicability of the federal Fourth Amendment after Wolfv. Colorado. The
Hudson majority asserts that times have changed and that modem, profes-
sional police, subject to the prospects of tort liability, would behave tolera-
bly well in a post-exclusionary-rule world.
No bet! In the first place, as Samuel Walker, on whose work the Hud-
son majority relied, pointed out after the opinion appeared, the exclusion-
ary rule is a major cause of police respect for law. If the rule were
eliminated, police administrators would have a dramatically reduced incen-
tive to train their forces in Fourth Amendment law and discipline officers
who violate it.
76. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
77. 530 U.S. 428, 436-37 (2000).
78. See id.
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In the second place, there is substantial evidence tending to show that
police professionalism actually increases the risk that the police will ex-
ploit weaknesses in the remedial scheme by violating substantive Fourth
Amendment rights for the sake of incriminating evidence. The exclusionary
rule gives cities and departments an incentive to train their forces, but the
training the police receive seems to be more concerned with admissibility
than with legality.
This concern with admissibility is not a relic from some bygone age.
There are plenty of reported cases in which the police deliberately ex-
ploited the standing rule to obtain incriminating evidence against a target
other than the search victim. The persistence of police perjury is a more
sinister sign of the same motivation. Police interrogation training programs
teaching the officers to question illegally for the sake of obtaining admissi-
ble fruits is another such sign.79
Opportunity cost would still direct the police to high-probability cases.
The tort remedy might be enough to maintain the warrant requirement. It
seems hard to believe that the police would not engage in a great many
more illegal auto searches and Terry stops. In these cases OC and LC are
both quite low, and the desire for evidence is a major factor in the incen-
tives facing police.
Legislatures and courts, including the Supreme Court, might respond
by strengthening the damage action for violations, authorizing liquidated or
punitive damages, or restricting or abolishing the immunity defense. This
turn really would risk over-deterrence in a way that the exclusionary rule
does not. I doubt that even the current justices would either strengthen the
tort action or acquiesce in a wave of police abuse. If the exclusionary rule
were abolished, it would be back within a decade.
CONCLUSION
Given a correct normative account of over-deterrence, the available
empirical evidence suggests that the current remedial mix is not over-
deterring Fourth Amendment violations. Indeed, when opportunity cost and
the risk of tort damages are both low, the current mix is probably under-
deterring, perhaps substantially. A majority of the Supreme Court seems to
regard this situation as acceptable, which casts doubt upon the proposition
79. See Jessica M. Weitzman, Note, They Won't Come Knocking No More: Hudson v. Michigan
and the Demise of the Knock-and-Announce Rule, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1209, 1211-12 (2008) ("[U]nless
the exclusionary rule is applied to knock-and-announce violations, police officials may encourage
officers to bypass knock-and-announce guidelines in much the same way they have encouraged officers
to question suspects 'outside Miranda."').
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that they would dramatically alter the current remedial mix. That the Court
would be willing to make this radical change and curtail its own institu-
tional power in the process seems improbable.

